Here is an executive summary of General Federalism, which can also be found here



On General Federalism[1][1]

A Canonical, Executive Summary of the essentials of General Federalism

Cyrus “Kir” Komrik




It can be said that the study of Economics and Law are bound by a common compass since both regard the study of the disposition of both tangible and intangible value within a community as a discipline fundamental. Whatever the appropriate purview, the end of all government is to render that disposition just. It is to the nature and scope of that justice, exacted in a Republic and approximated by the collective experience gained through various times and cultures, that we focus this work.


Though the ideas outlined herein may have been discussed previously in various quarters, the more specific purpose of this work is to examine three concerns: What does a Federalist government with unlimited, or general, geographic jurisdiction look like, what does equity under Federalism not only in law but generally in all areas of the social contract, such as in economics, look like, and what variant of Federalism offers the most durable, that is most general, jurisdictional application over time? Such a system we shall denominate a General Federalist system. We further aver that such a general formulation is the closest approximation to the ideal Republic practically achievable.


A growing body of experience in Federalism in the United States and new economic information regarding the planned economies of former socialist States is beginning to shed more light on the ideal form of the Republic as originally envisioned by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. Coupled with an analysis of the effect of rapid technological change in society in the last 100 years, and further change expected to occur at a geometric pace which informs this analysis of Federalism, we present a new, comprehensive set of recommendations regarding the precise elements of the ideal Republic.


This paper concludes that, despite the lack of widespread popularity, Alexander Hamilton's vision was the closest approximation to the ideal Republic the Founders sought and the only realistic path toward a truly durable Democracy. But we shall, as our considerations will show, require a reconsideration of the meaning of "democracy" as it is currently understood. Thus, we shall apply the guide given by Hamilton only inasmuch as it lays out a path to durability, but not necessarily the content of durability. By closely examining the legal and economic characteristics of popular faction and the "greater good", and the symmetry properties these two phenomenon display as, on the one hand, an influence upon government, and on the other hand, the resultant public policies pursued by government, we establish a new standard for measuring durability that is objective and testable.


We further find that Hamilton, while edging remarkably close to a conclusion we could only reach with an additional 200 years of experience, identified some economic institutions as legitimate objects of the social contract. We find that the whole of economic activity is indeed a necessary and legitimate component of the social contract and that, hitherto, an economy governed by a durable Democracy and that in the greatest likelihood exceeds the performance of the current U.S. economy has never been described until now.

  1. Methodology

We are fortunate to live in one of the most propitious periods in history where a more complete, bottom-up re-evaluation of government and society couldn't be more timely and practical: in the 20th century we saw the rise and fall of a peculiar socio-economic system based on the works of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, the blossoming under capitalism of what is probably histories' most powerful and influential world power and the beginnings of a drastic pattern of change in the technological infrastructure of civilization, now racing forward at a geometric pace. But perhaps most significantly, we now have a new kind of evidence amassed over the last 200 or so years to complement the collective human experience in social contracts. With the advent of the technological age, greater precision in measurement and access to social variables has revolutionized our ability to understand the social contract in practice, making the lessons learned in the 20th century all the more valuable for analysis. We can now more knowledgeably inquire, albeit with notable exception and necessary constraint, as to the merit and qualitative nature of systems based on measured past performance.


The current environment considered is modern-day United States of America, or the U.S. The future environment is global with the addition of consideration of various aspects of the culture and societies that can be reasonably expected to change in the foreseeable future. Regarding terminology, I will use the word "government" in this paper to refer to all civic institutions acting as executors of the social contract. In other words, I do not use the word in the manner often used in the European literature in which it refers only to a particular cohort of elected officials. Also, I shall use the term ex parte to imply that I am considering additional parties to a case that, in the strict legal sense, would not always be considered party to the case. This is consistent with the broader motif I will be painting regarding the issue of justice.


We shall focus in this paper on the elements of democracy we shall posit are the most crucial to understanding the form and substance of a Republic. To do that, we will examine two classes of measurement; the first is the delegation of authority specifically tailored to serve sub-group constituencies and the second being the delegation of authority specifically tailored to serve constituencies in toto, both evaluated over time and expressed in proportion to population. This constitutes an examination of the evolving functional 'output' side of government which we shall describe herein.


We shall perform a similar analysis of economic metrics; the first metric examined being the change in financial productivity and the second metric examined being the change in real income, both evaluated over time. We shall restrict our sources to what is available and relevant, in this case being data only for industrial employment. If, upon examination of any one instance we establish the hypothesis then a complete treatment of all data is unnecessary.


By clearly defining our terms we will reflect on the meaning of our results in the context of what we are proposing; a more comprehensive form of Federalism. Our hypothesis is three-fold;

  1.           I.    The Federal and State governments of the U.S., taken as a whole, are not representative of The People in the sense of the notional Republic as described herein.
  2.          II.    The regnant social contract of the U.S. lacks durability and we thus project a geometrically progressive, functional decline over time, probably initiated by a tipping event.
  3.         III.    We propose that a fundamental law for a general Federal system that is, in legal principle, both Republican and durable, may obtain under the right circumstances.


  1. Functionally Symmetric or General Federalism


Hamilton and Madison, the principal founders of Federalism sought a body of fundamental Law that satisfied two seemingly inconsistent goals. The first was to find a body of fundamental Law to serve as the basis of a government that was representative of The People. The second was to create this framework in such a way as to ensure its long-term durability. But durability of a regime depends heavily on a government's ability to adequately address the better interests of the nation as a whole which, at times, may be incongruent with the sometimes fugitive interests of selected portions, cohorts or factions of The People. Therein lay the seeming inconsistency. This sought after, almost mythical structure was known loosely at the time as a "Republic" and they were not the first to seek it. The early Federalists found their answer in a clever system that functionally took an admixture of input to produce what they hoped was a more or less just and proportionate output. The implicit functional premise, one that holds generally true for the social contract, is that in any population of people one will typically find interests common to the group as a whole and interests specific to sub-groups. It's easy enough to create a fundamental body of law to represent either of those interests, the common group interests being general and the common sub-group interests being special. History is replete with examples of regimes of this kind; each one evidencing a transience and non-durability arising from their disproportionate representation, and in varying degrees of fidelity to their constituencies, of either general or special interests. History has shown time and again that the more biased the representation, regardless of fidelity to the governed, for either general or special interests within a regime is the less durable it is. And durability is no small matter. Non-durable regimes, by definition, have relatively short life spans with a lethargy and inability to function preceding their collapse, usually violent and severely disruptive, that undermines their raison d'etat; the ability to effectively implement and manage the social contract.


So, the challenge is in representing both interests in proportionate fidelity to The People's interests; the essential character of the mythical Republic and the inconsistency that has stumped legal theorists for centuries. But we shouldn't be too surprised: Proportionate fidelity to the general and special interests of humanity is not possible if incongruity between them exists, as is most often the case. What Hamilton and Madison were attempting to do was to enhance this fullness, not perfect it in the ideal Republic. Our focus then, is on the ideal form even if it cannot practicably be obtained. We do that because the ideal form gives us the perspective we need to create the real thing. In a sense, the form is a template and without it we cannot create useable forms.


The age-old search for the ideal Republic calls us to ask philosophical questions such as what admixture of influence in the stream of governance best reflects the natural stream of popular thought; that is, the combined legal and economic interests of humanity? On a simplistic level, the admixture that best reflects the combined interest of humanity is that admixture whose proportionate magnitudes of influence most closely match the proportions of popular thought within society. In a phrase, we seek the form of that notional Republic retaining the highest functional symmetry[2][2] between cause and effect: The natural influences on government are the cause by which an effect is just and the durable symmetry of the substance of cause and effect is the sought-after Republic. Performance in the notional Republic is proximately measured by the degree of symmetry attained in the functioning of the social contract employed. Maximum symmetry between the collective interests of humanity and government policy with a government that can't, in its function, balance the influence of general and special interests more or less equally will not be attained. General interests consist of one "stream" of influence, and special interests to a mixed "stream" of influence. The complex combination of former and latter constitutes the mélange of influence aforementioned. We are making original use of several terms in this work, one of which is "symmetry" which should not be confused with the normal understanding of the term in which it refers to the relationship between federal and state powers. Where other original uses occur we will note that fact.


Another way of understanding functional symmetry is by way of an illustrative thought experiment. We can imagine a government as a function that takes as input the combined, collective interests of all those it governs, the domain, and produces Law and equity, the range that reflects those interests. Informally, I shall suppose that a government is functionally symmetric if the range, "r", is a constant multiple of the domain, or "d". Formally we can say that a functionally symmetric government, f, is a rule that assigns to each element d of a set D exactly one element, called f(d) in a set R. As government is not a mathematical exercise, we can understand this relationship without need to associate numerical quantities to domain and range and to such ephemeral quantities as "reflections of interests" but rather, we understand it here in a heuristic, qualitative sense. It follows then, that a government whose domain and range are not constant multiples of each other is functionally asymmetric. Of course, the true or ideal symmetry of the Republic is a thought experiment, an idealization that one cannot expect to perfectly achieve in practice. But it is the template by which humankind progresses and the sine qua non of performance in its role as the notional Republic. This necessity of approximation arises from the fact that the interests of the governed will not, in all matters, be congruent. But we can approximate ideal symmetry by identifying the collection of matters of interests that are congruent society-wide; i.e. general interests in combination with the collection of matters of interest represented in popular faction - those matters of interest incongruent society-wide - special interests. For the purposes of discussion, even though all human governance is functionally asymmetric by virtue of the fallibility inherent in the heterogeneousness of congruent constituents of faction, we shall assume that any government synthesizing both general and special interests as proportionately described is symmetric and all else asymmetric; i.e. we assume the template. To more clearly distinguish the two, I shall refer to the perfectly symmetric notional Republic as ideally symmetric and the practicably symmetric as herein described as functionally symmetric. The relation is defined more accurately by stating that the durable, functionally symmetric social contract is in proximo gradu ideally symmetric.


In a functionally symmetric legal and economic system justice for the many redounds to justice for the few depending on general equity informed by naturally occurring asymmetric injustices status quo ante. As a first-order approximation, and until I explain the term, one may consider "general equity" as analogous to equity in law. For our purposes it is useful to delineate more precisely the kind or type of justice of which we speak. Justice in and for the general interests of society (the "many" euphemized above) I shall denominate the distributive justice of community while Justice in and for the special interests (the "few" euphemized above) I shall denominate the popular justice of faction. Justice, in the strict sense, requires only the fair and proper administration of law. But here we take "law" to mean "only that law generated and enforced by a functionally symmetric general contract" because we are specifically interested here in both natural and statutory law rather than the broader, strictly legal meaning. In the legal sense the conflict between distributive and popular justice emerges in one of several ways: the gravity of the need for justice, distributive or popular, depends on the gravity of injustice status quo ante. The adjudicating body, in the most general sense the government, must decide to which type of justice it shall lend greatest merit, popular or distributive. A functionally symmetric government lends or disfurnishes greatest merit on the basis of the gravity of injustice status quo ante. And government becomes asymmetric - by the manner in which it functions - whenever it lends de gratia to any interested party whenever they materially conflict. From hereon following my steps will beg notice of two emerging, salient themes.


The first is that what I am describing is a broader sense of equity in law in the exercising of justice. Here I am using the concept in conjunction with law in which I treat the remedies of equity as things dispensed not only by judges but by the institutions of the social contract itself. The institutions of the social contract are in fact in place in consequence of law and the dispensations of such bodies are tantamount, in deed, to the dispensations of a judge. Under this broadened view of equity in law, Nonspecific Performance as dispensed by the institutions of government emerges de facto and confers an expectation upon the governed by consequence of the unspecified acts of performance necessary to comply with statutory Law. Those acts may not, themselves, constitute adherence to statutory Law and are in fact acts of equity. Strictly speaking, this does not constitute equity in the legal sense because the performance exigible, although real in fact, does not satisfy the definition of Specific Performance. In other words, there is no need of an explicit dispensation as a judge might issue, but rather, unspecified performance is demanded of the governed for compliance with statutory Law. This, of course, makes dispensation of remedy more abstract but is a remedy nonetheless. Just as Specific Performance enforces the execution of a lawful contract, Nonspecific Performance enforces the execution of the social contract; a special case of contract law. From hereon, I shall distinguish my use of the term equity in law from the stricter legal understanding by referring to it not as equity in law but general equity:


A particular circumstance is subject to general equity if recourse to principles of justice via any general remedy of the State to legislate, correct or supplement the law as applicable to that circumstance presents.


Secondly, and related to the first point, I speak of justice in the broader sense of the furtherance of the social contract, not just in the strictest sense of the purview of courts. Parliamentary governments, by virtue of the predicates upon which they are founded, lend greatest merit to popular injustices of faction, regardless of gravity. Capitalism, as we shall later see, ex sua natura lends greatest merit to distributive injustices of community, regardless of gravity. These tendencies to grant merit come in degrees, but it is a fairly straightforward matter to locate political philosophies on one end of this spectrum or the other; Madisonian Federalism, Confederalism and Parliamentary ideology on the one end and Capitalism as lex naturae, Marxism, National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism on the other. From the foregoing we can establish a formal definition of functional symmetry and its converse as follows:


Definition 1

A social contract, whether implicit or explicit, is said to be functionally asymmetric, and thus non-durable, if it functionally exercises, ex parte, popular justice of faction or distributive justice of community.

[Proviso: the economy is not a full statutory object of the social contract in question]


Definition 2

A social contract, whether implicit or explicit, is said to be functionally symmetric, and thus instantaneously durable, if it functionally exercises popular justice of faction and distributive justice of community such that general equity ranks justice applied to each injustice status quo ante proportionately.[3][3]

[Proviso: the economy is not a full statutory object of the social contract in question]


And we can apply these definitions to legal and economic standards over time: any system which has variably desisted or enjoined over time popular justice of faction ex parte or distributive justice of community ex parte is, ipso facto non-durable. Put another way, in conditions of ex parte enforcement of Nonspecific Performance the historical evidence has already demonstrated, prior to the failure of the State, that the system has not only passed through a functional symmetry absent ex parte application but that functional symmetry in repose it does not obtain. Rather, its visit to functional symmetry was fugitive and tendentious of its ultimate direction. It is changing, but not on a constructive path. We can formally define this evolution as follows:


Definition 3

A social contract is said to be observably durable if and only if no law or general equity evidencing an elimination or introduction within an arbitrary time of justice ex parte under the adjudication of said law and equity, either special or distributive, presents.

[Proviso: the economy is not a full statutory object of the social contract in question]


Definition 4

A social contract is said to be observably non-durable if a law or general equity evidencing an elimination or introduction within an arbitrary time of justice ex parte under the adjudication of said law and equity, either special or distributive, presents.

[Proviso: the economy is not a full statutory object of the social contract in question]


To assess the state of functional symmetry and durability then requires only a simple proposition; can evidence of the conditions of the aforementioned definitions be established in any given case? As a simple proposition requires no expositor, causality of circumstance need not be demonstrated for either of the definitions to be satisfied. In this work we are concerned only with establishing that the appropriate metrics for proving the proposition exist.

Fundamental Law consistent with functionally symmetric governance has the following properties:

1.) A separation between fundamentally enumerated legislative, judicial, executive and economic powers to lend durability by precluding usurpation by inter-governmental faction.

            a.) A Supreme Legislature [enumerated powers to constrain b, c and d]

            b.) A Supreme Judiciary [enumerated powers to constrain a, c and d]

            c.) A Supreme Executor [enumerated powers to constrain a, b and d]

            d.) A Supreme Trustee [enumerated powers to constrain a, b and c]

2.) A functional legal mechanism for the just management of general equity which best disfurnishes ex parte dispensation of popular justice of faction and distributive justice of community.

a.) A Supreme Legislature with a co-equal representation of popular faction and general interests which implies a multiple bodied structure with at least two Houses for respective representation.

b.) A Supreme Trustee with a co-equal representation of popular faction and general interests which implies a multiple bodied structure with at least two Houses for respective and distinctive types of representation.

c.) A Supreme Judiciary with Justices selected on indirect representation to balance the influence of both popular and general interests.

d.) A Supreme Executor elected by popular vote but retaining necessary powers for the furtherance of distributive justice of community while being ethnically representative.

e.) A census-based broadening of representation in a House of Representatives made proportionate to total population to account for change in population and to balance the influence of both popular and general interests.

f.) A constitutional limitation on the right to petition or lobby the government by restricting such rights to unorganized (individual) petition.

3.) A separation between fundamentally enumerated vertical powers; a balance of sovereignties between the various verticals in governance to lend durability.

a.) Sovereignty separated and maintained by "firewalling" the treasuries of each government at each vertical level. Primarily serves to limit encroachment of Federal sovereignty.

b.) Sovereignty separated and maintained by overt enumeration in fundamental Law of the powers to be held at each vertical level. Primarily serves to limit encroachment of the sovereignties of any faction.

c.) A provision to limit the duration of amendments to narrow the influence of popular faction of cohort. Specific enumerated guidance on the process of State sponsored Conventions for amendments. Primarily serves to limit the amelioration of State sovereignty.

d.) An enumerated power at the Federal layer to enhance the influence, but not the direct powers, of Federal authority in all other levels of governance. Primarily serves to limit encroachment of non-Federal sovereignties. Appointment of State Governors at the Federal level should be sufficient for this end.


The above recommendations constitute a proposal for a Federal social contract, short of the economic recommendations to be made in the next section. The combination of these provisions with those recommended in Section III, and a final jurisdictional feature, will constitute a more generally applicable form of Federalism, which I shall denominate General Federalism.


Next I intend to show that a durable functionally symmetric system ineluctably locates the economy within the purview of the social contract.


  1. Fiducial Economics


To assess the state of functional symmetry and durability as it arises economically once again requires only a simple proposition; can evidence of the conditions of the definitions of functional symmetry and durability be established? As a simple proposition requires no expositor, causality of condition need not be demonstrated for either of the definitions to be satisfied. Here we will develop the metric for measuring functional symmetry and durability in economics.


Because the positive is not normally assumed our proposition that economics is a legitimate part of the social contract begs the question, do economic conditions have the same or similar material effect as public law - in other words, does the economy affect the attainment of Republic thus making the whole of economics a legitimate object of the social contract? Perhaps a better way to ask the question is to ask are the members of a society who, in a free market economy, engage in commerce, labor and trade effectively engaging in a social contract; that is, a contractual relation more general than the specific contractual relations they may establish for any one, specific, economic relation. To answer this affirmatively requires that we show that economic circumstance may, with some reasonable level of frequency, constitute a social, generalized, contractual obligation, whether natural or statutory, between members of society. The general qualification includes terms of contract in addition to those that arise in a private contract in law. We aver that, for reasons that shall become obvious, a generalized contractual relation amongst members of a society exists by virtue of economic factors independent of statutory law (that is, occurring naturally) and that this relation derives through an economic phenomenon known as financial productivity; the economic corollary to justice in law.


Financial productivity is a measure of an entities valuable contribution to the economy as a whole, both in quantity and quality; as objective markets operating in valuable consideration rather than in imponderable consideration may define the whole. Thus, the financial productivity of an entity is positively correlated with the material value assigned the entity to or from, as the case may be - the economic community in which it exists; a community that is today effectively global. Therefore, the numeric relationship between financial productivity and the remuneration in wealth (monetary assignment of value) for it and the time duration an entity commits of itself to render that financial productivity is the one and only predicate of general equity in economic transaction. That relation constitutes a general contract, regardless of the specific, regnant mathematical relation - between a producer and the economy as a whole. This is the fundamental economic reality of economic justice ostensibly sought but which has escaped the likes of Marx, Engels and the whole of capitalist thinkers for centuries.


That a generalized contractual relation of economic exchange can be said to exist requires some background discussion before proceeding. Students of law and economics know that, at their most fundamental levels, law and economics are the study of the assignment of value in society. The distinguishing factor between assignment of value by law or economics is that, in economics, the assignment of value in society makes consequent to an emerging natural order that transforms the material status quo. That is, it is the material status quo of a set of stakeholders reflected into the future from the stakeholder's status quo ante. And the assignment of value in society by law makes consequent to the value judgments held by human beings whereby human beings deliberately, not naturally - assign value according to an ostensibly consensual ethics system called law. One is natural and the other an artifact of human cooperation. As economic assignment is natural and not amenable to volitious influence (otherwise it is not economic, but an assignment by law). The role of government in genuine economic assignment is properly identified as a contractual relation governing the assignment of value to which nature is already predisposed; provided the contract is necessary and minimally sufficient for that purpose. It follows that this must be true if the assignment is purely economic. And to clarify our phraseology, we need to elaborate on what we mean by the terms "necessary" and "minimally sufficient":

A law is "necessary" if and only if the execution in whole of the law can not be reasonably and reliably expected to render the object of that law (the law's purpose or intent) when in the absence of a social contract established between the contracted stakeholders. Simply stated, the proclivity of human beings to engage in cooperation and self-serving altruism we take to be a naturally occurring phenomenon whether a social contract exists or not, but the fraud, deception and corruption that may come with it is contained or eliminated only by the presence of a common ethic in law that opposes it.

A law is "minimally sufficient" to render it's object (the law's purpose or intent) if, of the set of all possible laws that can be reasonably expected to render that object, the law presenting as such redounds to the least obligations of Specific and Nonspecific Performance combined for execution in whole. Simply stated, we take it as manifest prudence to favor those ethical frameworks (law) which adequately preclude fraud, deception and corruption in economic transaction which require the least obligation to performance upon contracted parties or stakeholders.

Given these observations, the conclusion that the role of government in economics can be assigned unambiguously to the aggregate time and productivity a given individual proposes to contract for valuable consideration in the marketplace, is now clear. The actual values of compensation in any given case will not be general and are immaterial for our purposes, but the relationships can be stated generally as being the value (wealth) as a sum of the fixed proportion of uniform compensation for financial productivity "sold" and the profit it fractionally earns at market under free and open valuable consideration and a uniform and constant contracted value assigned for the time given per fractional, unit profit. By this formula economic equity is ponderable and known and any society governed by Rule of Law must, by definition, enforce it explicitly.

For any economic enterprise which offers a product or service in valuable consideration in the market there is associated with it a cost of presentation. It is the Enterprise that, ex proposito, transforms capital, labor and ingenuity into the added value that constitutes the aforementioned valuable consideration at market. A cost, generally less than the valuable consideration at market, is associated with this process. Labor, by its involvement in the process, represents a key step in the creation of the valuable consideration presented at market, which we here leave separate from the cost of presentation for the purposes of our demonstration. Thus, the difference in the valuable consideration at market (p) and the cost of presentation (c) divided by the total number of units considered (U), multiplied by the units produced by a given entity (u), all divided by the time commited by the entity (t), is the financial productivity (ve) of the entity that produced it. That is, ve = (u * (p, c) / U) / t

ð  t * ve = t * (u * (p, c) / U)

The difference between the valuable consideration of a commodity at market (p) and the cost of producing the commodity (c) I shall refer to as "productive" consideration. I'll qualify this by pointing out that consideration does not, by itself, imply specific value, only that a monetized value is considered in an enforceable contract. I use the term "productive" here simply to denote that the value I'm discussing is something less than the consideration anticipated at fair market. In an economy where no contractual proportion is established in law or nature between productive consideration and the remuneration for it the economy is operating ex parte, and is thus functionally asymmetric, by virtue of the fact that the contractors contribution to the overall economy is out of proportion to the overall economies contribution to the contractor, when and if the vagaries of the market so dictate. In other words, remuneration, or general equity, is dispensed ex parte of valuable consideration at market. This results in distributive justice of community ex parte or popular justice of faction ex parte, depending on the circumstances. The former is the augury of free markets, the latter of socialist economies. As the social contract forever seeks justice, remuneration by general equity establishes that economics is a legitimate object of the social contract.


Definition 5

An economy is functionally asymmetric if no contractual proportion in law or nature between valuable consideration and the respective remuneration for its cause presents.


Definition 6

An economy is functionally symmetric and thus durable if contractual proportion in law or nature between valuable consideration and the respective remuneration for its cause presents in all economic relations.


And we can apply these definitions to the economic standards over time: any economic system which transitions either to or from, by natural or statutory contract, remuneration in proportion to valuable consideration is non-durable. Put another way, in conditions of ex parte enforcement of Nonspecific Performance the historical evidence has already demonstrated, prior to the failure of the State, that the system has not only passed through a functional symmetry absent ex parte application but that functional symmetry in repose it does not obtain. Economically speaking, Nonspecific Performance manifests itself in society by either a buyer or seller who either desists or enjoins economic transaction in consequence of general equity. We can formally define this condition as follows:


Definition 7

An economy is said to be observably durable if and only if, by natural or statutory contract, remuneration in proportion to valuable consideration presents in all economic transactions.

Definition 8

An economy is said to be observably non-durable if no natural or statutory contract provides for the remuneration in proportion to valuable consideration presents.

Having established that economics is a legitimate object of the social contract, we can summarize our previous findings:


Definition 9

A social contract, whether natural or statutory in whole or in part, is said to be functionally symmetric, and thus instantaneously durable, if it functionally and exclusively exercises popular justice of faction and distributive justice of community such that general equity ranks justice applied to each injustice status quo ante proportionately and if contractual proportion in law or nature between valuable consideration and the respective remuneration for its cause presents in all economic relations.


Definition 10

A social contract is said to be observably durable if and only if no law or general equity evidencing an elimination or introduction within an arbitrary time of justice ex parte under the adjudication of said law and equity, either special or distributive, presents and, by natural or statutory contract, remuneration in proportion to valuable consideration presents in all economic transactions.


Definition 11

A social contract, whether implicit or explicit, is said to be functionally asymmetric, and thus non-durable, if it functionally exercises, ex parte, popular justice of faction or distributive justice of community or if no contractual proportion in law or nature between valuable consideration and the respective remuneration for its cause presents.


Definition 12

A social contract is said to be observably non-durable if a law or general equity evidencing an elimination or introduction within an arbitrary time of justice ex parte under the adjudication of said law and equity, either special or distributive, presents or no natural or statutory contract providing for the remuneration in proportion to valuable consideration presents.


Definition 9 uses the language "and exclusively" which is a proviso that will be explicated in the next section. While it may seem to be an unexpected conclusion, definitions 9 and 10 strongly imply that a social contract that faithfully serves the end of government; that faithfully dispenses justice, is one that, through its attendant institutions, regulates what is, in the broadest sense, a free market, by the calculus of compensation and valuable consideration according to the formulaic proportions aforementioned of financial productivity and labor time, or labor hours, expended. Such a scheme requires a much more dynamic model of free market regulation than what is possible with a traditional legislature, as is the model currently used in the United States. And we call any economy thus regulated a "Fiducial Economy" which consists of the following salient properties:

  1. All organizations or other contractual compensation or hiring within the economy would have assigned to them Fiduciaries whose primary role is to perform the calculations aforementioned to the best fidelity the state of the art will allow.
  2. A legislative body called the House of the Fiduciary which shall establish in law the general compensation proportions, but not values, to be lawful for economic exchange.
  3. Regulation on both ends of the market cycle; regulation of both employer-employee and seller-buyer transactions.
  4. The House of the Fiduciary to commission, as it sees fit, any and all research and laboratory testing for the purpose of maximum standardization and uniformity in the calculation of financial productivity.
  5. Each Fiduciary must be accountable to the House of the Fiduciary to ensure general equity:
  6.                               I.        Each Fiduciary commissioned by law by the House of the Fiduciary, each Fiduciaries powers exercised jus fiduciarium.
  7.                              II.        The citizen's fiduciary stricto sensu.
  8.                             III.        The compensation transaction "middle-point" by which payroll accounts credit the accounts established by law to which the appropriate Fiduciary completes the transaction into private accounts. Fiduciary actions required by law for each transaction: retrieval of financial productivity figures and hours expended for the period in question, calculation of compensation on the basis of those figures and to tender funds to private interest.
  9.                            IV.        The purchase transaction "middle-point" by which private accounts credit the accounts established by law to which the appropriate Fiduciary completes the transaction into accounts receivable. Fiduciary actions required by law for each transaction: Track and record all exchanges as part of valuable consideration; payment tendered and signature of receipt of product or service, both being the condition of final transfer.

In the closing section I will codify, according to the framework provided by Definitions 9 through 12, the fundamental Law appropriate for the creation of a General Federalist Republic in the Constitution proposed below.

The House of the Fiduciary would be granted the defined, limited and exclusive power to regulate all economic exchange for ensuring economic equity in all exchanges under the jurisdiction of the Federation. But it would not act as owner or Fiduciary of commercial assets nor act as the operator of any business in or outside the jurisdiction of the Federation (this means no appointed "governors" running for profit corporations).

The House of the Fiduciary would perform the regulatory and legislative tasks associated with commerce which, in the United States, are handled and are the responsibility of the United States Congress en masse. The primary difference, other than it being a specific organ set aside for this sole purpose, is that it will have the power and responsibility to create regulatory authorities that can regulate Capitalist enterprise in real-time and which shall be invested with the power to intervene in any commercial exchange on behalf of an employee, employer, buyer or seller wherever commercial equity (as in general equity) is an issue. In other words, it can, as a court does, issue Specific Performance upon any person or entity to enforce economic equity. To be clear, one must read our definitions of economic equity to understand what that means: it does not refer to planned distribution of wealth but is a use of the term 'equity' as limited in use in law. "Equity" here means fair and proportionate exchange in all commercial contracts and activities and restricting valuable consideration to economic contexts in which all parties enjoined have fair and equal standing.

This still allows some degree of economic planning at a central level without giving carte blanche authority via ownership and management. Additional Constitutional specificity should restrict this organ from engaging in activities that usurp the traditional powers associated with Board appointed or hired employees, such as CEOs whose role is to manage overall operations on behalf of stockholders. In this way, the dangers of the powers of ownership by government are eliminated and the durability of the system overall is enhanced. Concomittantly, durability is further assured by providing a mechanism to enforce commercial equity and prevent the kind of class warfare and cynicism associated with unregulated, or de facto unregulated by virtue of an inability to regulate, private economic material agenda.

A final word on the bigger picture we've painted. The astute reader may care to note that in our elaboration of functional symmetry what we have in fact done is to elaborate upon and better define Rule of Law. What our discussion shows is that Rule of Law is much more demanding in realization than most would like to believe. A system that is functionally symmetric in all the ways discussed supra is the only system for which Rule of Law can truly be said to exist. Everything else is either not that at all or is merely an approximation or deception. The United States is a prime example of mass deception vis-a-vis Rule of Law and has little of it in reality. The western law literature is full of dramatic, histrionic discussions and thought processes extolling the virtue of Rule of Law and claiming that it exists in the United States with a kind of eloquent, clever distortion of how courts in the United States actually work.

Zero-Zero Banking: general equity under General Federalism

Economic equity is best served by simplifying the system and thus removing opportunities for fraud and corruption. So, Fiducial Economics focuses prejudicially on how one manages the size of the currency (M1 and M2 mainly) in circulation with respect to the actual size of the wealth in toto at any given time, t. The solution fractional reserve banking gives us is, in lay terms, to "print" money upon the purchase of government bonds, thus injecting cash into the banking systems when the government deposits its newly minted "cash". Without going into too much detail of the problems this can create with respect to opportunities for fraud, Fiducial Economics solves many of these issues by greatly simplifying the whole process of monetary management: the idea under Fiducial Economics is to "print" money and transfer it to a designated manager (intrepreneur) or prospective owner upon the approved demand of a qualifying investment or ownership risk by tying the "print" directly to each individual "approval". Actuarial compensation for this transfer of risk to society en masse is then reflected in "inflation". The risk of corrupting influence is then controlled by a double-blind process: the Fiduciary making any risk assessment decision is legally barred from knowledge of the identity of the person or entity making application and the applicant is likewise legally barred from knowledge of the identity of the corresponding Fiduciary, to the extent possible where limited by the required applicant risk inventory considered. In addition, the overall process is sufficiently randomized in operation to ensure no such knowledge transfers indirectly. This process is similar to the common court practice of random rotation of Judge's on trial calendars. And conditions of recusal are stipulated to avert conditions where knowledge presents indirectly.

The effect of this practice is to simply change monetary volume in circulation atomically instead of macroscopically (which introduces all sorts of hedge rows for fraudsters to hide other people's money behind). The considerable advantage of this is that it eliminates all interest assessments, repayment of principle or conditions conducive to fraud and corruption at the macro economic level. And rather than applying some arbitrary reserve stipulation such as a 10% reserve, no reserve at all is required, thus accelerating the rate of economic development limited only by the efficacy of the financial proposition itself (and the abililty of actuaries and applicant to show convincingly an increase in wealth at least equal to the wealth the currency print represents). Thus, we note that one condition for eliminating interest assessment is that the investment effected must have an immediate or near immediate assessed valuable consideration in the market (new wealth) sufficient to equal or exceed the currency "print" size. In this manner, system-wide inflation is either eliminated or greatly reduced from what is inevitable in a typical fractional reserve system (some have argued that this inflation is in fact a reflection of the fraud occurring within the banks themselves, that is, it is the cost to society of "skimming off the top" at the Reserve bank level). We denominate our system, in contrast to the well-understood "fractional reserve monetary system" - a "zero-zero monetary system": zero reserve with zero growth caps. Or, stated more simply, a "zero-zero system".

In this model, all investments undertaken with "loans", here more accurately called M1 demands, are technically public property since no premium or interest repayment is required. But the key difference between this and a Marxist or Socialist model is that the intrepreneur making application initiates, manages and benefits from the investment with the same rights one would have by ownership. The intrepreneur is thus acting as a Public Fiduciary and we refer to this situation as a "fiducial easement" upon public property. Having said that, constitutional protections are put in place to preclude fiducial easements by government and it is necessary to codify the condition that all such easements must be to and for private citizens (intrapreneurs) with no conflicts of interest in government.

But our description is still incomplete. Under a zero-zero system we noted in passing that M1 demands are honored on the basis of standard credit and risk assessment, just as is done today in the economy of the United States. But for completeness we note that general equity as previously discussed required a command economy inasmuch as a representative government must act to enforce it. This is accomplished by presenting quota driven "options" derived from economic plans codified by the Fiduciary. These "options" are a listing of investments mode and/or types relative to the quota, or quanta, of economic acitivty for each sector which economic plan directs. Priority in request can then be determined on the basis of the credit and risk scoring each applicant makes relative to all other applicants in a manner standardized and codified by the Fiduciary in Law. The astute reader will notice that we are proposing something like an intraperneurial economy of productivity based remuneration. One can start to visualize this by starting with a generally Marxist-Lenninist model, then constraining it with the aforementioned qualifiers. Similar elements of this idea are found in the ChengBao policies of the modern PRC. But these labels will not suffice to describe what we are proposing here which, as best as we can tell, constitute a set of ideas that are unique in economic theory.

In summary, and in contrast to the labels above, we can describe a zero-zero economy and, more generally, General Federalism as an ideology which espouses a global governance of a federal design in which power is exercised by hereditary bodies whose authority to govern is dynamically and continually delegated or revoked by a democratic process and whose economy is characterized by a commercial base that is publicly owned but operated by private individuals and in which all remuneration is derived of the best productivity measures available for each role at any given time. These conclusions all originate logically from the premise of rule of law and equity in law and economics. The reader may care to note that the two biggest shortcomings of Marxist-Lenninist systems are rendered moot under any similarity in General Federalism by fundamental differences that drive individual producitivity on the basis of self-interests and provide a means for a command economy to act with knowledge of market trends and directions via direct market feedback in intrapreneurial activity. And as a final distinction, the revolutionary theory behind Lenninism is in fact a weaker facet of the General Federalist idea that any regime not acting under a General Federalist set of predicates is by definition not fully compliant with rule of law and is thus in fact not only a fair target for revolution but is in fact an inherently defined outlaw regime. Thus, under General Federalism, acts which recognize outlaw regimes as legitimate, such as treaties, cannot be permissible. If, for the sake of discussion and pragmatism, one of many nations adopts a General Federalist system, then unilateral commitments by that government can be made to maintain the peace and prosperity. This would be necessary in any case General Federalism establishes a foothold of jurisdiction that is still not global.


  1. Jurisdiction and Right of Conquest

We now turn our attention to the matter of geographic jurisdiction and the inalienable rights of people. We begin by first treating the issue of jurisdiction with a thought experiment and imagine a presumably General Federalist system of law co-existing with a sovereign actor; to wit, an actor sovereign with respect to the presumably General Federalist system of law. This actor may be another sovereign authority, person or State or any other kind of actor, the only condition we require is that the actor acts with the capacity of a sovereign relative to the presumably General Federalist system considered. The acts of the sovereign actor constitute an act for which remedy may be sought. By virtue of the fact that it is sovereign it admits of no remedy within the jurisdiction of The Federation presenting and general equity does not attain. The proviso "and exclusively" of Definition 9 is now explicated. This can be seen in the thought experiment by considering any sovereign act which may, by its nature, be a cause unto an effect which converts and redounds to cause within the jurisdiction of the hypothetical Republic. But that is inherently asymmetric. To appreciate the full significance of this observation, consider an effect, and blatant example - such as the horrific attacks in the United States on 11 September, 2001, or some hypothetical attack by a foreign actor in which nuclear weapons are discharged. While a simple observation it has considerable consequence: the ideal Republic cannot co-exist with one or more sovereign regimes. Put another way, a General Federation co-existing with other sovereignties isn't really "general". The result, and current status quo, is that bullies and potentates, acting without accountability to the people they affect, irresponsibly exist and fight their battles on the international scene like children on a playground, but with far more devastating and totalitarian results. It is pure barbarism and denies any semblance of the basic ingredients of civilization: cooperation.

The conditions of functional symmetry and durability are satisfied only if and when universal jurisdiction attains. Only by exercising universal jurisdiction can the form of the template best approximate the ideal Republic. We can summarize these features of the General Federalist system by noting that a General Federalist government:

  1.               I.        Is the Supreme Law and authority for and of all and retains plenary jurisdiction.
  2.              II.        Continually seeks to maintain plenary, consent jurisdiction by social contract with any entities or material matters of general equity in economics and law.

Though it seems a difficult myth to counter in the midst of the Golden Age of Democracy, we must take care to examine all aspects of consensual governance in light of the definitions we've given. Of course, on a purely personal level, "consensual governance" simply cannot exist if at least two persons disagree on any issue, a certainty by any measure. Thus, the question becomes, with what approximation of consent do we abide? What exactly is civilized cooperation under law and economic equity? To answer this, we review definitions 9 and 10:

Definition 9

A social contract, whether natural or statutory in whole or in part, is said to be functionally symmetric, and thus instantaneously durable, if it functionally and exclusively exercises popular justice of faction and distributive justice of community such that general equity ranks justice applied to each injustice status quo ante proportionately and if contractual proportion in law or nature between valuable consideration and the respective remuneration for its cause presents in all economic relations.


Definition 10

A social contract is said to be observably durable if and only if no law or general equity evidencing an elimination or introduction within an arbitrary time of justice ex parte under the adjudication of said law and equity, either special or distributive, presents and, by natural or statutory contract, remuneration in proportion to valuable consideration presents in all economic transactions.

It is from these definitions, when read carefully, that the myth of democracy reveals itself. But it also requires a sense of humility in interpretation: the liberty of the human soul attains not in the most selfish acts into which one may engage, but in the acknowledgement that free people act selfishly. Simply put, people do not always act in their own best interests even when perfectly well aware of what that requires. It is not an issue of education, wisdom or intelligence, but an issue of the most basic urges of human nature ill-informed of the long-term foresight few humans possess or much care about, to include the leaders and potentates. Thus, popular justice of faction, when ranked against injustice status quo ante, and when guided with the dispassionate long view of foresight, reveals itself in fact to be the same thing as distributive justice of community: humans are truly one large family whose best interests are shared, not divided. This is nothing more than a re-statement of the ethos of civilization itself. Thus to deny it seems a remarkable claim.

But if that be the case, then why so much passion for democracy in our age? Because the Kings and potentates have exploited basic human urges of selfishness for their own. The problem of selfishness is not limited to "the masses" but manifests amongst the most elite and truly dangerous amongst us. Indeed, one could argue that selfishness reigns greatest amongst them; hence the reason they are the potentates in the first place. Only the most virtuous amongst them can acknowledge this and render loyalty not to self but virtue. Thus, we see that rule of law, fundamental law, cannot by itself solve the problem of the perpetuation and perfection of civilization. The problem is cultural. We are now prepared to issue a final definition central to the philosophy of General Federalism:

Definition 11

The end of all government is to tender the guarantee to all subject to its implied social contract that motive in virtue prevails over all else by and with the instrument of contract itself.

This alters but remains in the spirit of our initial hypothesis taken from the words of Alexander Hamilton. It is the fundamental axiom by which a cultural impediment to the ideal Republic is overcome by rule of law. In other words, virtue cannot be legislated or written into a Constitution, but a Constitution can demand and require its selection of the executors of the social contract. But this is hardly satisfactory. How does one do this? We can take heart in the fact that there is an answer to this problem and we do have the ability to turn from a barbaric past. Let those yearning for real freedom and liberty read on.

The answer to this problem lies in boundaries. Having demonstrated that the interests of the people are the interests of the Nation we are left with just one not so simple problem to resolve. If we select executors of the social contract on the basis of the interests of the Nation, by what mechanism do we constrain their motives to virtue over self, that is, to the better interests of the Nation over their own selfish urges? While one cannot force virtuous behavior, one can approximate it closely by elimination. Putting the question differently, are there boundaries we can create that exclude selfish motive in executors? This requires two steps:

1.)   a rule of law for choosing executors that guarantees those who seek the role will not find it. It must be unambiguous and not easily subject to suborning by law or manipulation. It must be simple and natural.

2.)   a rule of law that contains within it the means for either the interdiction of poor motive or the forceful removal of those harboring selfish motive whenever it by chance appears, all without destabilizing rule of law itself; depending on the severity of the threat.

We propose the following response: executors are chosen by hereditary succession made less prone to ulterior motive by a separation of powers amongst multiple, regnant dynasties and family-wide consent within each required to act on the social contract. Second, we propose that only The People, that is, all those subject to the jurisdiction of the executors, be the final judge of whether motive be virtuous or untoward. This can only happen by first, healthy fear and intimidation within the dynasties of such judgment being passed and the consequences thereof and secondly, by the power to forcefully remove any official family acting with suspicious motive.

We note that we shall come full circle regarding rule of law wherein we see that bias in rule of law is preferable when insulated heavily from faction. By rule of law we will be considering it in the classic forms of functional rule of law and substantive rule of law (both are applicable here and taken together redound to the phrase we use here, rule of law).

A final point is that the astute reader will note at once that definition 9 or 10 cannot attain in any form of "democracy". The reason for this is no more complex than the simple observation that if any two randomly selected citizens cannot agree on at least one topic, then the resolution of public policy depends on the citizen with the more forceful representation, not on the most prudent position taken. Even if we assume cooperation to full contentment of both parties, is it irresponsible and insouciant to assume that all such divergence amongst an entire population will result in plenary contentment. It cannot. Thus, we can no longer rely on a contract written prescriptively without explicit reference to culture. The dynamics of the natural human family are a worthwhile approach. But we also note at once that by their very nature, the elitists who benefit from the fraud of democracy have the most to lose and are the consummate experts in the manipulation of public opinion. This problem must be overcome, and it must be pursued only by the most virtuous amongst us less it become the very thing we seek to destroy. Narcissism is dangerous but also powerful; a double-edged sword.

The Final Solution to regaining control of human civilization from the predators and despots that so fill our history books depends, ironically, on culture. Certainly, relying on a fundamental Law as a guide to behavior can and should be employed under full force of Law, but we mean to say that the virtuous cannot rely upon it solely. This should not be misconstrued: We absolutely are not suggesting that fundamental Law be treated as a guide only that, in the end, despots can only be contained by something greater than these words alone. For some of the war-weary this is obvious, but we needed to establish the case definitively before proceeding with an idea so anathema to the Age of Democracy. Hamilton's epic vision and work is now complete.

Adding some specifics to our proposal, the model we propose consists of institutions essentially identical in role to the primary institutions of government in the United States today, all of which derives from the philosophy outlined in this paper and that of Madison and Hamilton. There are, in this scheme, 4 branches of government, with another acting as the moral check. This check is called the Senate. Its members consist of representatives elected by equal suffrage by all citizens of The Federation aged 12 and older who elect to exercise that right. The unique age limits are chosen for equivalence to the official family powers, to be explained later. This "branch" does not meet in the same city or region as the other Houses. Its powers are:

It retains sole authority to impeach any official family, its power to do so scaled by percentage vote. Two-thirds or greater yea is required for full removal of an official family from power with a two-thirds concurrence of the 3 remaining Houses. Four-fifths majority is required with concurrence of two other Houses and 85% majority required with 1 other House concurring. Finally, a 90% majority can remove a House from power without any concurrence.

It may exercise, at its discretion, the Power of Interdiction, the power to veto any bill passing either or both Supreme Legislator and Supreme Fiduciary when also passed by Supreme Executor upon four-fifths majority.

It retains sole Right of Conquest, the power to forcefully remove any one or combination of dynasties from power with a high majority and carefully constructed sequence of steps designed to prevent the Senate from usurping power itself.

No bills or other laws originate in this House.

Each Royal House is in fact a biological family of traditional form (non-traditional families may also partake but non-traditional roles are not eligible for succession or input into matters of State) including the following genetic relations living in one home:

1.)   All first cousins of immediate family, no removal.

2.)   Both a father and mother married

3.)   All children of the mother, father or both (under age 12 are not eligible for input into matters of State)

4.)   Both parents of the mother and father

5.)   All uncles and aunts of all children

All members must live in the same Home or Domestic complex. Members of the family choose a Head of Household who is Head of Family (traditionally a King or Queen) upon creation and may designate a direct, blood heir (not necessarily agnatic) as their successor. Unless otherwise designated, the line of succession follows the default precedence: first to last born, regardless of sex. No laws concerning consanguinity or consent after age 12 can be levied upon them which necessitates the same for the general population for the purposes of uniformity in rule of law. This should not be taken to preclude laws protecting minors or others from abuse or exploitation.

The Supreme Fiduciary is responsible for all public property within the jurisdiction of the The Federation, with constitutionally protected rights of private property. Public and private property is constitutionally established as coexisting and no private property may, for any reason, be converted to public (unless granted by the owner at fair market value). The Supreme Fiduciary is analogous to the U.S. Senate as a purely economic organ responsible for planning the economy. Economic Plans carrying the weight of Law and impacting only the Public Trust originate here and are passed to the Supreme Legislator for passage. Once there, the law moves to the Supreme Executor who must sign it before it becomes law (though it may be interdicted before that by The People).

The Supreme Legislator is analogous to the U.S. Senate in that laws impacting the Treasury, including all tax laws, originate here and are passed to the Supreme Fiduciary for passage. Once there, the law moves to the Supreme Executor who must sign it before it becomes law (though it may be interdicted before that by The People). The Supreme Fiduciary and Supreme Legislator may establish committees as needed between them to resolve portions of bills that may impact both Treasury and the Public Trust, ultimately requiring a vote in the appropriate House for each respective portion.

The Supreme Executor is the House of State, the executive voice of The Federation personified in the Head of House and granted powers similar to the president of the United States.

The Supreme Judiciary is the House responsible for the interpretation of all Laws and Economic Plans passed by all entities into law. It is the supreme court of appeal for The Federation. It may establish district courts as it deems necessary but many not establish any other official family bodies.

All four houses are simply Royal Families who create cabinets, committees, etc. as they deem necessary. The decisions they make are family decisions evidenced by public vote.

But the key differnece between the four Houses of a General Federation and a monarchy cannot be understated: Under General Federalism Rule of Law is KING and no hereditary Official has any power to act unilaterally. This is the key weakness of Monarchies and the primary reason why they have fallen out of favor. Perhaps the most salient characteristic of General Federalism, a natural exigible of the functional symmetry supra, is the strong bias and focus under General Federalism toward genuine Rule of Law, as opposed to the appearances of the same crafted in most western, neo-liberal societies of our day. As only one of many examples, the tradition of law in the United States of assigning judge's the role of "Officer de Jure" is yet one of many "escape tricks" used by dissemblers to create the appearance of Rule of Law but to in reality provide a clever means to allow judges to trump Rule of Law on a routine basis. These kinds of deceptions are required under "pseudo-democracies" in order to create the illusion of self rule, delegated by the people through those who create the rules of law, but which in reality retains power in the hands of an elite oligarchy. The flat-out incorrect and overly broad understanding running rampant in U.S. courts regarding Equity in Law is yet another example. Equity in Law does not mean that Judges have the power to contradict law, yet that is exactly what they do routinely in almost every case they hear. General Federalism slams this exit shut, cold.

For more detailed information, you might wish to read the attached draft of the Constitution found in the link at the top of this page.


VI. Notes




Economic notes[4][4]


See Edward P. Lazear "Performance Pay and Productivity" for more information on the effect of productivity based pay (though this study did not examine financial productivity but "piece rate" productivity).

Edward P. Lazear "Salaries and Piece Rates" Journal of Business July 1986, 59(3), pp. 405, 431

Also see Frederick Winslow Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management


This has been a K1ngK0mr1k Production

© 2005 - 2012 Cyrus “Kir” Komrik All Rights Reserved.

[1][1] Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.

Alexander Hamilton on the raison d'etre of the social contract


[2][2] In the usual academic discourse the root term "symmetry" is used to refer to a completely different aspect of Federalism [the legal relation between the federal government and it's States is said to be symmetric if that relation is constant across all States]. Here I use the term in a different sense, that is, in the sense of functional symmetry.

[3][3] For those who like maxims, compare this to Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. When seeking an equitable relief, the stronger hand is that which has been wronged. The stronger hand is that hand which has the capacity to ask for a remedy. In equity, this form of remedy is usually one of Specific Performance. This is a superior remedy to that which is administered at common law: damages.


Views: 69

Comment by Ron V on January 12, 2012 at 10:29pm



Long post- many things to absorb - need to read more

First thoughts - regardless of existing models, we now have 309 million people in the US and 6.8 billion people on the planet - previous models have not been applied to populations of these magnitudes.   Additionally, the economic "wealth" and prosperity in this country was dependent on abundant natural resources, cheap/slave labor, and relatively inexpensive fuel- these things no longer exist. 

Aristotle advocated only well educated leaders and did not think a democracy where the general public had too much of a "say" was ideal.  Personally, I think he may have been right - if so, I fear the level of intelligence in America, as well as the rest of the world, is sufficiently suboptimal for a "democracy" to be successful with respect to providing the standard of living people hope for or expect while preserving the planet for human sustenance.  What the leaders/regimes in power say and/or do (including those currently seeking power in the US) and what the majority of people here and abroad seem to believe/want/etc. makes me very skeptical that current government and/or economic models will be able to sustain us in the long run.

I need to read more of your post, but these are just some thought of after briefly reading the first part of your post. 

Comment by Kir Komrik on January 12, 2012 at 11:44pm

Hey Ron,


Thanks for reading, I'd love to have your input. I've reached a similar conclusion as you have. I think neo-liberal western "democracy" doesn't work.


- kk

Comment by Ron V on January 14, 2012 at 12:26pm

I've copied and pasted into a Word document for further reading.

Why did you write this?

Are you proposing a new structure for American government, independent countries, the world as a whole?

I do think it is time to revisit our government structure - our leaders are corrupt (campaign contributions, insider trading, etc), state and federal legislatures disregard the US Constitution with justification based on what the "majority" of their constituents claim they want (majority of Christians, of course) as well as write and pass legislation that furthers their religious agendas (anti-abortion/anti-contraception legislation, "In God We Trust," anti-evolution legislation, etc), and the Supreme Court has no limits on Justice terms and has essentially no peer review/quality control mechanisms like other organizations in the real world (should Justices like Scalia who are stuck in the 1700s and can't seem to accept or grip the realities of contemporary America really be allowed to serve until they can't walk anymore?). 

Comment by Kir Komrik on January 15, 2012 at 12:51am

Hey - I think Humanity is rapidly racing to its own annihilation for two primary reasons:

1.) religion (ignorance and superstition)

2.) lack of rule of law

So, I'm interested in deconversion and global rule of law. I guess I'm weird like that :-) Constitutions and governance are subjects of law and law is my passion.

- kk

Comment by Ron V on January 16, 2012 at 7:17pm

1) I agree- but I like to think there may be some hope- my daughter and some of her friends are at least agnotic, if not flat out atheists (but they are afraid to admit it because of the "loving" Christians they are surrounded by).

2) The rule of just bad in some countries (Sharia Law) and probably needs revisions in America.  Fundamentally, I think criminal law in America is pretty decent and the goals of freedom/liberty are ideals worth preserving, but our governmental structure/functioning and Constitutional Law have some problems (in my opinion). 

Personally, I think the primary reasons we will self-extinguish are religion, lack of reason/compassion (inseparable from religion, in my opinion), and greed.


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