Cross-National Correlations of Quantifiable Societal Health with Popular Religiosity and Secularism in the Prosperous Democracies
A First Look
 Two centuries ago there was relatively little dispute over the
existence of God, or the societally beneficial effect of popular belief
in a creator. In the twentieth century extensive secularization
occurred in western nations, the United States being the only
significant exception (Bishop; Bruce; Gill et al.;
Sommerville). If religion has receded in some western nations, what is
the impact of this unprecedented transformation upon their populations?
Theists often assert that popular belief in a creator is instrumental
towards providing the moral, ethical and other foundations necessary
for a healthy, cohesive society. Many also contend that widespread
acceptance of evolution, and/or denial of a creator, is contrary to
these goals. But a cross-national study verifying these claims has yet
to be published. That radically differing worldviews can have
measurable impact upon societal conditions is plausible according to a
number of mainstream researchers (Bainbridge; Barro; Barro and
McCleary; Beeghley; Groeneman and Tobin; Huntington; Inglehart and
Baker; Putman; Stark and Bainbridge). Agreement with the hypothesis
that belief in a creator is beneficial to societies is largely based on
assumption, anecdotal accounts, and on studies of limited scope and
quality restricted to one population (Benson et al.; Hummer et al.;
Idler and Kasl; Stark and Bainbridge). A partial exception is given by
Barro and McCleary, who correlated economic growth with rates of belief
in the afterlife and church attendance in numerous nations (while
Kasman and Reid  commented that Europe does not appear to be
suffering unduly from its secularization). It is surprising that a more
systematic examination of the question has not been previously executed
since the factors required to do so are in place. The twentieth century
acted, for the first time in human history, as a vast Darwinian global
societal experiment in which a wide variety of dramatically differing
social-religious-political-economic systems competed with one another,
with varying degrees of success. A quantitative cross-national analysis
is feasible because a large body of survey and census data on rates of
religiosity, secularization, and societal indicators has become
available in the prosperous developed democracies including the United
 This study is a first, brief look at an important subject that has been
almost entirely neglected by social scientists. The primary intent is
to present basic correlations of the elemental data. Some conclusions
that can be gleaned from the plots are outlined. This is not an attempt
to present a definitive study that establishes cause versus effect
between religiosity, secularism and societal health. It is hoped that
these original correlations and results will spark future research and
debate on the issue.
The Belief that Religiosity is Socially Beneficial
 As he helped initiate the American experiment Benjamin Franklin stated
that “religion will be a powerful regulator of our actions, give us
peace and tranquility within our minds, and render us benevolent,
useful and beneficial to others” (Isaacson: 87-88). When the theory of
biological evolution removed the need for a supernatural creator
concerns immediately arose over the societal implications of widespread
abandonment of faith (Desmond and Moore; Numbers). In 1880 the
religious moralist Dostoyevsky penned the famous warning that “if God
does not exist, then everything is permissible.” Even so, in Europe the
issue has not been a driving focus of public and political dispute,
especially since the world wars.
 Although its proponents often claim that anti-evolution creationism<1> is scientific, it has abjectly failed in the practical realms of mainstream science and hi-tech industry (Ayala et al.; Crews; Cziko; Dawkins, 1996, 1997; Dennett; Gould; Koza et al.; L. Lane; Miller; Paul and Cox; Shanks; Wise; Young and Edis). The
continuing popularity of creationism in America indicates that it is in
reality a theistic social-political movement partly driven by concerns
over the societal consequences of disbelief in a creator (Forrest and
Gross; Numbers). The person most responsible for politicizing the issue
in America, evangelical Christian W. J. Bryan,<2>
expressed relatively little interest in evolution until the horrors of
WW I inspired him to blame the scientific revolution that invented
chemical warfare and other modern ills for “preaching that man has a
brute ancestry and eliminating the miraculous and the supernatural from
the Bible” (Numbers: 178).
 In the United States many conservative theists consider evolutionary
science a leading contributor to social dysfunction because it is
amoral or worse, and because it inspires disbelief in a moral creator
(Colson and Pearcey; Eve and Harrold; Johnson; Numbers; Pearcey;
Schroeder). The original full title for the creationist Discovery
Institute was the Discovery Institute for the Renewal of Science and
Culture (a title still applied to a division), and the institute’s
mission challenges “materialism on specifically scientific grounds”
with the intent of reversing “some of materialism’s destructive
cultural consequences.” The strategy for achieving these goals is the
“wedge” strategy to insert intelligent design creationism into
mainstream academe and subsequently destroy Darwinian science (Johnson;
Forrest and Gross note this effort is far behind schedule). The
Discovery Institute and the less conservative, even more lavishly
funded pro-theistic Templeton Foundation fund research into the
existence and positive societal influence of a creator (Harris et al.;
Holden). In 2000 the Discovery Institute held a neocreationist seminar
for members of Congress (Applegate). Politically and socially powerful
conservatives have deliberately worked to elevate popular concerns over
a field of scientific and industrial research to such a level that it
qualifies as a major societal fear factor. The current House majority
leader T. DeLay contends that high crime rates and tragedies like the
Columbine assault will continue as long schools teach children “that
they are nothing but glorified apes who have evolutionized [sic]
out of some primordial soup of mud” (DeLay and Dawson). Today’s leaders
of the world’s largest Christian denomination, the Catholic Church,
share a dim view of the social impact of evolution. In his inauguration
speech, Benedict XVI lauded the benefits of belief in a creator and
contended, “we are not some casual and meaningless product of
evolution.” A leading church cleric and theologian (Schonborn)
proclaimed that “the overwhelming evidence for purpose and design”
refutes the mindless creation of Darwinian natural selection (also
Dean, Dean and Goodstein).
 Agreement with the hypothesis that popular religiosity is societally
advantageous is not limited to those opposed to evolutionary science,
or to conservatives. The basic thesis can be held by anyone who
believes in a benign creator regardless of the proposed mode of
creation, or the believer’s social-political worldview. In broad terms
the hypothesis that popular religiosity is socially beneficial holds
that high rates of belief in a creator, as well as worship, prayer and
other aspects of religious practice, correlate with lowering rates of
lethal violence, suicide, non-monogamous sexual activity, and abortion,
as well as improved physical health. Such faith-based, virtuous
“cultures of life” are supposedly attainable if people believe that God
created them for a special purpose, and follow the strict moral
dictates imposed by religion. At one end of the spectrum are those who
consider creator belief helpful but not necessarily critical to
individuals and societies. At the other end the most ardent advocates
consider persons and people inherently unruly and ungovernable unless
they are strictly obedient to the creator (as per Barna; Colson and
Pearcey; Johnson; Pearcey; Schroeder). Barro labels societal advantages
that are associated with religiosity “spiritual capital,” an extension
of Putman’s concept of “social capital.” The corresponding view that
western secular materialism leads to “cultures of death” is the
official opinion of the Papacy, which claims, “the proabortion culture
is especially strong precisely where the Church’s teaching on
contraception is rejected” (John Paul II). In the United States popular
support for the cultural and moral superiority of theism is so
extensive that popular disbelief in God ranks as another major societal
 The media (Stepp) gave favorable coverage to a report that children are
hardwired towards, and benefit from, accepting the existence of a
divine creator on an epidemiological and neuro-scientific basis (Benson
et al.). Also covered widely was a Federal report that the
economic growth of nations positively responds to high rates of belief
in hell and heaven.<3> Faith-based charities and education are promoted by the Bush administration<4>
and religious allies and lobbies as effective means of addressing
various social problems (Aronson; Goodstein). The conservative Family
Research Council proclaims, “believing that God is the author of life,
liberty and the family, FRC promotes the Judeo-Christian worldview as
the basis for a just, free and stable society.” Towards the liberal end
of the political spectrum presidential candidate Al Gore supported
teaching both creationism and evolution, his running mate Joe Leiberman
asserted that belief in a creator is instrumental to “secure the moral
future of our nation, and raise the quality of life for all our
people,” and presidential candidate John Kerry emphasized his religious
values in the latter part of his campaign.
 With surveys showing a strong majority from conservative to liberal
believing that religion is beneficial for society and for individuals,
many Americans agree that their church-going nation is an exceptional,
God blessed, “shining city on the hill” that stands as an impressive
example for an increasingly skeptical world. But in the other developed
democracies religiosity continues to decline precipitously and avowed
atheists often win high office, even as clergies warn about adverse
societal consequences if a revival of creator belief does not occur
Procedures and Primary Data Sources
 Levels of religious and nonreligious belief and practice, and
indicators of societal health and dysfunction, have been most
extensively and reliably surveyed in the prosperous developed
democracies (Figures 1-9).
Similar data is often lacking for second and third world nations, or is
less reliable. The cultural and economic similarity of the developed
democracies minimizes the variability of factors outside those being
examined. The approximately 800 million mostly middle class adults and
children act as a massive epidemiological experiment that allows
hypotheses that faith in a creator or disbelief in evolution improves
or degrades societal conditions to be tested on an international scale.
The extent of this data makes it potentially superior to results based
on much smaller sample sizes. Data is from the 1990s, most from the
middle and latter half of the decade, or the early 2000s.
 Data sources for rates of religious belief and practice as well as
acceptance of evolution are the 1993 Environment I (Bishop) and 1998
Religion II polls conducted by the International Social Survey Program
(ISSP), a cross-national collaboration on social science surveys using
standard methodologies that currently involves 38 nations. The last
survey interviewed approximately 23,000 people in almost all (17) of
the developed democracies; Portugal is also plotted as an example of a
second world European democracy. Results for western and eastern
Germany are combined following the regions’ populations. England is
generally Great Britain excluding Northern Ireland; Holland is all of
the Netherlands. The results largely agree with national surveys on the
same subjects; for example, both ISSP and Gallup indicate that absolute
plus less certain believers in a higher power are about 90% of the U.S.
population. The plots include Bible literalism and frequency of prayer
and service attendance, as well as absolute belief in a creator, in
order to examine religiosity in terms of ardency, conservatism, and
activities. Self-reported rates of religious attendance and practice
may be significantly higher than actual rates (Marler and Hadaway), but
the data is useful for relative comparisons, especially when it
parallels results on religious belief. The high rates of church
attendance reported for the Swiss appear anomalous compared to their
modest levels of belief and prayer.
 Data on aspects of societal health and dysfunction are from a variety
of well-documented sources including the UN Development Programme
(2000). Homicide is the best indicator of societal violence because of
the extremity of the act and its unique contribution to levels of
societal fear, plus the relatively reliable nature of the data
(Beeghley; Neapoletan). Youth suicide (WHO) was examined in order to
avoid cultural issues related to age and terminal illness. Data on
STDs, teen pregnancy and birth (Panchaud et al.; Singh and
Darroch) were accepted only if the compilers concluded that they were
not seriously underreported, except for the U.S. where under reporting
does not exaggerate disparities with the other developed democracies
because they would only close the gaps. Teen pregnancy was examined in
a young age class in which marriage is infrequent. Abortion data
(Panchaud et al.) was accepted only from those nations in
which it is as approximately legal and available as in the U.S. In
order to minimize age related factors, rates of dysfunction were
plotted within youth cohorts when possible.
 Regression analyses were not executed because of the high variability
of degree of correlation, because potential causal factors for rates of
societal function are complex, and because it is not the purpose of
this initial study to definitively demonstrate a causal link between
religion and social conditions. Nor were multivariate analyses used
because they risk manipulating the data to produce errant or desired
and because the fairly consistent characteristics of the sample
automatically minimizes the need to correct for external multiple
factors (see further discussion below). Therefore correlations of raw
data are used for this initial examination.
 Among the developed democracies absolute belief in God, attendance of
religious services and Bible literalism vary over a dozenfold, atheists
and agnostics five fold, prayer rates fourfold, and acceptance of
evolution almost twofold. Japan, Scandinavia, and France are the most
secular nations in the west, the United States is the only prosperous
first world nation to retain rates of religiosity otherwise limited to
the second and third worlds (Bishop; PEW). Prosperous democracies where
religiosity is low (which excludes the U.S.) are referred to below as
secular developed democracies.
 Correlations between popular acceptance of human evolution and belief
in and worship of a creator and Bible literalism are negative (Figure 1).
The least religious nation, Japan, exhibits the highest agreement with
the scientific theory, the lowest level of acceptance is found in the
most religious developed democracy, the U.S.
 A few hundred years ago rates of homicide were astronomical in
Christian Europe and the American colonies (Beeghley; R. Lane). In all
secular developed democracies a centuries long-term trend has seen
homicide rates drop to historical lows (Figure 2).
The especially low rates in the more Catholic European states are
statistical noise due to yearly fluctuations incidental to this sample,
and are not consistently present in other similar tabulations (Barcley
and Tavares). Despite a significant decline from a recent peak in the
1980s (Rosenfeld), the U.S. is the only prosperous democracy that
retains high homicide rates, making it a strong outlier in this regard
(Beeghley; Doyle, 2000). Similarly, theistic Portugal also has rates of
homicides well above the secular developed democracy norm. Mass student
murders in schools are rare, and have subsided somewhat since the
1990s, but the U.S. has experienced many more (National School Safety
Center) than all the secular developed democracies combined. Other
prosperous democracies do not significantly exceed the U.S. in rates of
nonviolent and in non-lethal violent crime (Beeghley; Farrington and
Langan; Neapoletan), and are often lower in this regard. The United
States exhibits typical rates of youth suicide (WHO), which show little
if any correlation with theistic factors in the prosperous democracies (Figure 3).
The positive correlation between pro-theistic factors and juvenile
mortality is remarkable, especially regarding absolute belief, and even
prayer (Figure 4). Life spans tend to decrease as rates of religiosity rise (Figure 5),
especially as a function of absolute belief. Denmark is the only
exception. Unlike questionable small-scale epidemiological studies by
Harris et al. and Koenig and Larson, higher rates of
religious affiliation, attendance, and prayer do not result in lower
juvenile-adult mortality rates on a cross-national basis.<6>
 Although the late twentieth century STD epidemic has been curtailed in all prosperous democracies (Aral and Holmes; Panchaud et al.), rates of adolescent gonorrhea infection remain six to three hundred
times higher in the U.S. than in less theistic, pro-evolution secular
developed democracies (Figure 6).
At all ages levels are higher in the U.S., albeit by less dramatic
amounts. The U.S. also suffers from uniquely high adolescent and adult
syphilis infection rates, which are starting to rise again as the
microbe’s resistance increases (Figure 7).
The two main curable STDs have been nearly eliminated in strongly
secular Scandinavia. Increasing adolescent abortion rates show positive
correlation with increasing belief and worship of a creator, and
negative correlation with increasing non-theism and acceptance of
evolution; again rates are uniquely high in the U.S. (Figure 8).
Claims that secular cultures aggravate abortion rates (John Paul II)
are therefore contradicted by the quantitative data. Early adolescent
pregnancy and birth have dropped in the developed democracies (Abma et al.; Singh and Darroch), but rates are two to dozens of times higher in the U.S. where the decline has been more modest (Figure 9).
Broad correlations between decreasing theism and increasing pregnancy
and birth are present, with Austria and especially Ireland being
partial exceptions. Darroch et al. found that age of first
intercourse, number of sexual partners and similar issues among teens
do not exhibit wide disparity or a consistent pattern among the
prosperous democracies they sampled, including the U.S. A detailed
comparison of sexual practices in France and the U.S. observed little
difference except that the French tend - contrary to common impression
- to be somewhat more conservative (Gagnon et al.).
 The absence of exceptions to the negative correlation between absolute
belief in a creator and acceptance of evolution, plus the lack of a
significant religious revival in any developed democracy where
evolution is popular, cast doubt on the thesis that societies can
combine high rates of both religiosity and agreement with evolutionary
science. Such an amalgamation may not be practical. By removing the
need for a creator evolutionary science made belief optional. When
deciding between supernatural and natural causes is a matter of opinion
large numbers are likely to opt for the latter. Western nations are
likely to return to the levels of popular religiosity common prior to
the 1900s only in the improbable event that naturalistic evolution is
scientifically overturned in favor of some form of creationist natural
theology that scientifically verifies the existence of a creator.
Conversely, evolution will probably not enjoy strong majority support
in the U.S. until religiosity declines markedly.
 In general, higher rates of belief in and worship of a creator
correlate with higher rates of homicide, juvenile and early adult
mortality, STD infection rates, teen pregnancy, and abortion in the
prosperous democracies (Figures 1-9).
The most theistic prosperous democracy, the U.S., is exceptional, but
not in the manner Franklin predicted. The United States is almost
always the most dysfunctional of the developed democracies, sometimes
spectacularly so, and almost always scores poorly. The view of the U.S.
as a “shining city on the hill” to the rest of the world is falsified
when it comes to basic measures of societal health. Youth suicide is an
exception to the general trend because there is not a significant
relationship between it and religious or secular factors. No democracy
is known to have combined strong religiosity and popular denial of
evolution with high rates of societal health. Higher rates of
non-theism and acceptance of human evolution usually correlate with
lower rates of dysfunction, and the least theistic nations are usually
the least dysfunctional. None of the strongly secularized,
pro-evolution democracies is experiencing high levels of measurable
dysfunction. In some cases the highly religious U.S. is an outlier in
terms of societal dysfunction from less theistic but otherwise socially
comparable secular developed democracies. In other cases, the
correlations are strongly graded, sometimes outstandingly so.
 If the data showed that the U.S. enjoyed higher rates of societal
health than the more secular, pro-evolution democracies, then the
opinion that popular belief in a creator is strongly beneficial to
national cultures would be supported. Although they are by no means
utopias, the populations of secular democracies are clearly able to
govern themselves and maintain societal cohesion. Indeed, the data
examined in this study demonstrates that only the more secular,
pro-evolution democracies have, for the first time in history, come
closest to achieving practical “cultures of life” that feature low
rates of lethal crime, juvenile-adult mortality, sex related
dysfunction, and even abortion. The least theistic secular developed
democracies such as Japan, France, and Scandinavia have been most
successful in these regards. The non-religious, pro-evolution
democracies contradict the dictum that a society cannot enjoy good
conditions unless most citizens ardently believe in a moral creator.
The widely held fear that a Godless citizenry must experience societal
disaster is therefore refuted. Contradicting these conclusions requires
demonstrating a positive link between theism and societal conditions in
the first world with a similarly large body of data - a doubtful
possibility in view of the observable trends.
 The United States’ deep social problems are all the more disturbing
because the nation enjoys exceptional per capita wealth among the major
western nations (Barro and McCleary; Kasman; PEW; UN Development
Programme, 2000, 2004). Spending on health care is much higher as a
portion of the GDP and per capita, by a factor of a third to two or
more, than in any other developed democracy (UN Development Programme,
2000, 2004). The U.S. is therefore the least efficient western nation
in terms of converting wealth into cultural and physical health.
Understanding the reasons for this failure is urgent, and doing so
requires considering the degree to which cause versus effect is
responsible for the observed correlations between social conditions and
religiosity versus secularism. It is therefore hoped that this initial
look at a subject of pressing importance will inspire more extensive
research on the subject. Pressing questions include the reasons,
whether theistic or non-theistic, that the exceptionally wealthy U.S.
is so inefficient that it is experiencing a much higher degree of
societal distress than are less religious, less wealthy prosperous
democracies. Conversely, how do the latter achieve superior societal
health while having little in the way of the religious values or
institutions? There is evidence that within the U.S. strong disparities
in religious belief versus acceptance of evolution are correlated with
similarly varying rates of societal dysfunction, the strongly theistic,
anti-evolution south and mid-west having markedly worse homicide,
mortality, STD, youth pregnancy, marital and related problems than the
northeast where societal conditions, secularization, and acceptance of
evolution approach European norms (Aral and Holmes; Beeghley, Doyle,
2002). It is the responsibility of the research community to address
controversial issues and provide the information that the citizens of
democracies need to chart their future courses.
Indicators of societal dysfunction and health as functions of percentage rates of
theistic and non-theistic belief and practice in 17 first world
developed democracies and one second world democracy. ISSP questions
asked: I know God really exists and I have no doubt about it =
absolutely believe in God; 2-3 times a month + once a week or more =
attend religious services at least several times a month; several times
a week - several times a day = pray at least several times a week; the
Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word
for word = Bible literalists; human beings [have] developed from
earlier species of animals = accept human evolution; I don’t know
whether there is a God and I don’t believe there is a way to find out +
I don’t believe in God = agnostics and other atheists.
A = Australia
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Information From: http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2005/2005-11.html