I just came across this on Wikipedia, and I am still reeling in astonishment. It's called the 'Omnipotence Paradox.' Just thought I'd throw it on here to give you guys some quick and easy ammo against theists. I'll give you the scientific idea, then the example (aka 'Paradox of the Stone').
If a being can perform such actions, then it can limit it's own ability to perform such actions. By this arguement, it cannot perform all actions, yet, on the other hand if it cannot limit it's own actions, then that is something it cannot do, and therefore, is not omnipotent.
And now for the easy version:

Could god create a stone so heavy that even he could not lift it? If so, he would then cease to be omnipotent. If not, he was not omnipotent to begin with.

Thank you for your time and patience. Another win for the Rationalists brought to you by your friendly neighborhood Atheist,


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To contunue...


Every formal system such as mathematics, logic, etc. has it's limitations--the Liar's Paradox from the perspective of philosophy, or the halting problem/endless loop from the perspective of computer and information sciences, or Gödel's incompleteness in mathematics. It would seem then that we must exercise our free will to "weigh the facts." I think J.P. Moreland articulates it better than I can:


"Acts of deliberation presuppose that the rational process is ‘up to me’ and is not determined prior to or during the process. The conclusion is drawn freely. My act of deliberation itself contributes by way of exercises of active power to what outcome is reached. Acts of deliberation presuppose that there is more than one possible conclusion one could reach, but if determinism is true, there is only one outcome possible, and it was fixed prior to the act of deliberation by forces outside the agent’s control. In deliberation, we not only weigh evidence, we also weight evidence – freely assign it certain importance in the rational process. Moreover we stand at the end of deliberative processes as intellectually responsible rational agents. Our conclusions are ones we or anyone in relevantly similar circumstances ought to draw. On the reasonable assumption that ought implies can, then genuine epistemic responsibility requires free will."

I did not reply to your first reply because I found it too confusing. I do understand all of it but I do not understand where you are going with this. The fact is that even if absolute determinism is a state of things we cannot really live by it. Morality presumes free choice and so does deliberation. But just because we cannot conceive of not being free, that does not mean that is not the case. Since you invoked the Godel`s theorem of incompleteness, let me use it in its most simplified form to illustrate my point. The GTI states that the axioms (basic claims which are taken for granted) of a system can only be confirmed by invoking evidence from outside the system. In the case of determinism (which I assume to hold for the whole universe), we are a part of the universe and, since we are part of the said system, we cannot hope to find evidence with which to confirm the very fundamental laws of that system (including determinism). Practically speaking, our subjective stance can never conform to the idea of determinacy, but neither can it act according to the fact that time does not exist. We are trying to objectify everything, but we cannot be objective in analyzing things of which we are a part. Time, free will, etc. are qualities of our subjective experience, and necessary ones at that. But that still does not say anything about them really being the state of things. Whether we should even consider talking about it if it doesn`t affect our everyday view of things is a very plausible argument. But not because it is not so, but because it very well may be that we can never know those things.

Here`s a mind-bender. Can God choose not to be free? If he can, then he is not free. If he can`t, he is not free. Therefore, God is deterministic. If God created everything, how could something deterministic create something which is not?

"Can God choose not to be free? If he can, then he is not free. If he can`t, he is not free."

Could not this be linked to the notion of rationality? As in: God's general behavior is rational and a subject of free will. He has the ability for irrational behavior but (occationally) choose to avoid it due to free will. He will be deterministic if he always choose the most rational choice because reason is predictable. God can therefore choose to be not free, but it's an irrational choice.

(The only assumption required for the conclusion is an overweight of rational vs irrational behavior.)


In any event, it doesn't matter too much since it appears God has retired after a flurry of activity around 6k years ago. ;)

"Can God choose not to be free? If he can, then he is not free. If he can`t, he is not free."


Well, if he can choose not to be free, then he can have the choice but not exercise it, no?

Can God make another God even more Godly than Himself?


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